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Roth, Circuit Judge: 
 
         Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Allegheny County and Tom Foerster, Chairman of the Board of 
Commissioners of Allegheny County and a member of the Allegheny 
County Salary Board, charging that Foerster had eliminated their 
jobs with Allegheny County because they supported Joe Brimmeier 
in the Democratic primary for Prothonotary.  Allegheny County and 
Foerster moved for summary judgment based on absolute legislative 
immunity because plaintiffs' positions had been eliminated by a 
vote of the Salary Board.  Foerster also claimed qualified 
immunity for his actions as a member of the Salary Board.  The 
district court denied the motions on the ground that Foerster was 
not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for his pre-vote 
activities and that  municipalities do not enjoy legislative 
immunity from Section 1983 suits.   Both defendants appeal the 
denial of absolute legislative immunity.  We  agree with the 
district court's reasoning and will affirm. 
                           I.  Facts 
      Tom Foerster was Chairman of the County Board of 
Commissioners and a member of the Salary Board throughout the time 
the events in question took place.  The Allegheny Salary Board is 
composed of four members:  three County Commissioners and the 
County Controller.  The Board sets the maximum and minimum salary 
range for County jobs.  It is also the only entity within the 
County with the power to create or eliminate positions.  
     In May 1991, Joe Brimmeier, a former aide to Foerster, 
ran in the Democratic primary for the position of Prothonotary of 
Allegheny County.  Foerster vocally opposed Brimmeier's candidacy.  
The four plaintiffs actively supported Brimmeier in the primary 
election.  Brimmeier lost. 
     Foerster was re-elected Commissioner in November, 1991.  
 Following the election, James Dodaro, the County Solicitor,  
notified Foerster of his plan to resign at the end of the year.  
Foerster appointed Ira Weiss to replace Dodaro  as of January 6, 
1992.  On January 3, three days before his appointment was 
effective, Weiss fired plaintiffs, Roberta Rudolph and April Moore, 
and told them that their positions as administrative assistant and 
Risk Manager were being eliminated.   When Dodaro intervened to ask 
Weiss to keep Rudolph and Moore, Weiss reportedly replied, "No, 
they want them out now."  Rudolph and Moore were offered alternate 
positions as typists at approximately half their salaries.  They 
rejected these positions.  On January 8, 1992, five days after 
notifying Rudolph and Moore that their jobs were eliminated, Weiss 
signed a request asking the Salary Board to eliminate nine 
positions, including those held by Rudolph and Moore.  On January 
16, 1992, the Salary Board unanimously approved the request.   
      Plaintiffs Phyllis Carver and Thomas Fox held positions 
in the Department of Development.  Carver was a planning and 
evaluation specialist, and Fox was manager of marketing.  Shortly 
after Brimmeier's candidacy for Prothonotary failed, Foerster 
allegedly had Wayne Fusaro, one of his Executive Aides, compile a 
"hit list" of Brimmeier supporters.  The list reportedly included 
Carver and Fox.  
       On June 19, 1992, George Braun, the Director of 
Development, notified Carver and Fox that he was eliminating their 
positions because of budgetary concerns. Two other positions within 
the Department of Development were eliminated at the same time.  
Braun submitted his request for Salary Board action on June 12, and 
the Salary Board unanimously approved his recommendation for 
termination on June 18.  Neither Fox nor Carver were offered 
positions elsewhere in county government.   
     According to the defendants, Braun's elimination of the 
positions was spurred by a Federal Housing and Urban Development 
audit, which had found excessive administration expenses by the 
department.  The defendants assert that the positions were 
eliminated as part of a larger attempt to keep down administrative 
costs.  The defendants further contend that at the same two 
sessions that the plaintiffs lost their positions, the Salary Board 
took additional actions affecting 19 other county departments, 
resulting in the elimination of twenty two other positions.  In her 
Report and Recommendation, however, the magistrate judge noted that 
about the time Fox and Carver's positions were eliminated, three 
new positions were created in the Department of Development and 
other employees received raises.  
     The plaintiffs assert that the Salary Board would 
automatically approve any proposal to eliminate jobs without 
independent consideration and that once Foerster made it known that 
he wanted plaintiffs' positions eliminated, the vote of the Salary 
Board was a mere formality.  
     On June 9, 1993, the plaintiffs filed suit against 
Allegheny County and against Foerster, individually and in his 
official capacity as Chairman of the Allegheny County Board of 
Commissioners.  After extensive discovery, defendants filed for 
summary judgment.  The magistrate judge denied defendants' motion.  
The District Court adopted the magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation.  Defendants have appealed that portion of the 
District Court's decision relating to absolute legislative 
immunity, as well as those defenses "inextricably intertwined" with 
their immunity claims. 
            II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
     Ordinarily, this court does not have jurisdiction to 
review a lower court's denial of summary judgment since a denial of 
summary judgment does not constitute a "final decision" within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291.  See In re City of Philadelphia 
Litigation, 49 F.3d 945, 956 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 176 
(1995).  When the summary judgment motion is premised on absolute 
immunity, however, the district court's denial is immediately 
appealable because it falls within the collateral order doctrine: 
"that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of 
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of 
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."  Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546,  69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 
(1949).   
     Absolute immunity is an issue of law, separable from the 
merits of the case, which once denied cannot effectively be 
preserved for later review by an appellate court.   "[T]he denial 
of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable 
before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its 
possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a 
civil damages action." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 
S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985) (ruling on qualified immunity immediately 
appealable). See also  See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
741-43, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2697-98 (denial of presidential immunity 
immediately reviewable on appeal) and Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d. 
597, 606 (3d Cir. 1994): "The Nixon case makes clear that we have 
appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the former members of 
the County Council are entitled to absolute legislative immunity."  
 
     A district court's denial of summary judgment,  premised 
on absolute legislative immunity, is therefore immediately 
appealable.  For this reason, we have jurisdiction to consider the 
district court's denial of summary judgment with regard to the 
immunity claims.  Moreover, because absolute immunity is a purely 
legal question, we exercise plenary review over the district 
court's decision.  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 609, citing Donivan v. 
Dallastown Borough, 835 F.2d 486, 487 (3d Cir. 1987) cert. denied495 U.S. 
1035, 108 S.Ct. 1596 (1988). 
    III. Foerster's Individual Claim to Legislative Immunity     According 
to Foerster, he is entitled in his individual 
capacity to absolute legislative immunity from suit because of his 
membership on the Salary Board, the governing body that ultimately 
approved the elimination of the plaintiffs' positions with the 
County.  Plaintiffs respond that their complaint does not concern 
Foerster's vote as a member of the Salary Board but is directed at 
the actions he took prior to and independent of that vote in order 
to persuade his department heads to bring about the elimination of 
their positions.  The parties focussed a great deal of their 
argument on the question whether the Salary Board acted legisla- 
 
tively or administratively when it voted to do away with the 
plaintiffs' positions.  We do not find, however, that the status of 
the Salary Board is the dispositive question of individual immunity 
in this case.  Rather, the issue is whether Tom Foerster's pre-vote 
actions as a Commissioner can be separated from his vote as a 
Salary Board member.  
     We will start our analysis with an examination of the 
general principles of legislative immunity and how it applies to 
local legislators in § 1983 cases.  Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, "Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected any 
citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."  The term "persons" 
includes local and state officers acting under color of state law.  
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).  The Supreme 
Court has recognized, however, that public officials, sued in their 
individual capacities, may under certain circumstances enjoy 
immunity from § 1983 suits.  In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 
71 S.Ct. 783 (1951), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of 
legislative immunity, as applied to state legislators, survived the 
enactment of § 1983.  In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171 (1971),  the 
Court extended the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity to 
members of a regional legislature.  Finally, in Aitchison v. 
Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983), this circuit, following the 
example of our sister circuits, held that local legislators enjoyed 
absolute immunity from personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for acts taken in their legislative capacities. 
     In Aitchison, we considered whether a mayor and borough 
attorney were entitled to immunity for the passage of an ordinance, 
which abolished the position of building inspector.  We recognized 
in Aitchison that executive officials might exercise legislative 
power along with their administrative duties, and we adopted a 
functional approach to the question of when immunity should apply.  
"In appraising the mayor's need for absolute immunity, we look to 
the function the individual performs rather than his location 
within a particular branch of government." Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 
99.  Using this functional approach, we found that the mayor was 
entitled to absolute immunity for the act of voting for an 
ordinance that resulted in the abolition of an employment position.  
Because the complaint sought compensation for the mayor's vote and 
established "active participation by the mayor in the legislative 
process," the mayor was immune from liability for damages under 
Section 1983.  Id.   
     Since Aitchison, we have repeatedly stated that a public 
official's legislative immunity from suit attaches only to those 
acts undertaken in a legislative capacity.  "It is only with 
respect to the legislative powers delegated to them by the state 
legislatures that the members of local governing boards are 
entitled to absolute immunity."  Ryan v. Burlington County, New 
Jersey, 889 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1989); Acierno, 40 F.3d at 610.   In 
Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1290-91, we devised a two-pronged test for 
determining whether or not a municipal body's action was "legisla- 
 
tive" or "administrative" in character.  To be legislative, the act 
must be (1) substantively legislative, such as "policy-making of a 
general purpose" or "line-drawing"; and (2) procedurally legislati- 
 
ve, such that it is "passed by means of established legislative 
procedures".  We refined the first prong of this test in Aciernowhen we 
held that although the number of persons affected by a 
given decision might be an important factor in the two-part 
immunity analysis, it was not dispositive. 
     Using this same approach, we conclude that Tom Foerster 
is not entitled to legislative immunity for any non-legislative 
actions he took to abolish the plaintiffs' positions.  In coming to 
this conclusion, we will assume, without deciding, that the Salary 
Board's vote to eliminate plaintiffs' positions was "legislative" 
in nature.  In addition, we will assume that a legislative body's 
decision to eliminate a government position,  in contrast to the 
mere termination of a person's employment, is legislative activity. 
See Rataree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988).   Neverthe- 
 
less, we do not think that such legislative activity by the Salary 
Board shields Tom Foerster from liability.  As a County Commission- 
 
er, Foerster acted in  various capacities -- legislative, executive 
and administrative.  In giving a unilateral order to have Brimmeier 
supporters fired, Foerster would not be engaging in policy-making 
of general application regarding the expenditure of County funds, 
but would be making either an executive decision on how the 
anticipated cutback should be implemented or an administrative 
decision that certain individuals should be fired.  Actions taken 
in a executive or administrative capacity are not entitled to 
absolute immunity. 
     Plaintiffs have not named the Salary Board in their 
complaint; neither do they cite Foerster's vote as a Salary Board 
member as part of their claim.  Rather, they seek restitution for 
the course of conduct -- harassment, threats, and retaliation -- in 
which Foerster allegedly engaged prior to and independent of the 
Salary Board's vote.  Even if the Salary Board's decision was part 
of a policy to cut waste from the county government, Foerster's  
conduct, if proven, constituted retaliatory conduct  targeted at 
specific individuals because of their support for a political 
adversary.  If Tom Foerster used his position as Commissioner to 
"punish" county workers for their support of Brimmeier, that abuse 
of power for personal ends cannot be made "legislative" simply by 
eliminating plaintiffs' positions instead of firing them outright.  
Were the Salary Board nonexistent and Tom Foerster able to 
eliminate County positions without any legislative approval 
whatsoever, we have no doubt that he could be held liable under 
Section 1983.     
     In addition, we do not think Foerster's actions are 
necessarily rendered "legislative" by the Salary Board's ultimate 
vote in favor of eliminating plaintiffs' jobs.  An unconstitutional 
or illegal course of conduct by county government does not fall 
within the doctrine of absolute immunity merely because it is 
connected to or followed by a vote of a county board.  For example, 
in Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1986), we held 
that the director of a health bureau created by the cities of 
Allentown and Bethlehem could maintain an action against the mayor 
of Allentown for persuading the two city councils to dissolve the 
health bureau and thereby eliminate the director's position.   
Bartholomew brought suit for his dismissal against both the City of 
Allentown and the mayor.  In reversing the district court's 
dismissal of the case, we stated that the mayor's persuasion of the 
city council constituted "official city policy" and was sufficient 
to sustain a claim against the city under Section 1983. 
                    "Indeed, as Mayor Fischl was powerless to discharge 
                    Bartholomew himself, the Mayor's only available means 
of 
                    effecting appellant's termination was to persuade the 
                    city council of Allentown, the city's official 
lawmakers, 
                    to dissolve the BiCity Board of Health and the Bureau 
                    altogether, thereby eliminating Bartholomew's 
position.  
                    It is this course of conduct that Bartholomew refers 
to 
                    [in his complaint] ...." 
                     
          Bartholomew, 782 F.2d at 1153.  In recognizing Bartholomew's 
claim 
against the city, we specifically noted the mayor's role in 
securing his release, concluding, "Defendant Fischl, as Mayor of 
Allentown, was certainly a government official with policy-making 
powers ...."Id.  Despite our awareness of Fischl's position as 
mayor, we did not dismiss Bartholomew's suit against him.  
Although our holding may not address the question of absolute 
immunity, it nevertheless supports the principle that an official's 
executive or administrative actions are separable from actions 
taken in a legislative capacity.   See also Meding v. Hurd, 607 
F.Supp. 1088, 1110 n. 28 (D.Del. 1985) (actions of Town Council in 
terminating the police chief are not legislative merely because 
termination was achieved by a vote of the council). 
     Moreover, we reject defendant's assertion that Foerster 
is entitled to immunity because he could not have caused the 
plaintiffs to lose their positions without the support of at least 
two of the three other members of the Allegheny Salary Board.  
Causation is not an issue in this case at this time.  Causation 
relates to the merits of plaintiffs' claims, not to the question of 
absolute immunity.  The issue of causation is a fact-driven 
inquiry, requiring the district court to make findings about the 
role both of Foerster and of the Salary Board in eliminating the 
plaintiffs' positions.   At this stage in the litigation, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider a factor, such as causation, which goes to 
the merits of plaintiffs' claims.  See Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 
2151(1995).  Although defendant's causation argument may have some 
bite at a later stage, it has no bearing on the issue of absolute 
legislative immunity for Foerster's pre-vote activities. 
     Finally, we are satisfied that our rejection of absolute 
immunity as applied to Foerster will not, as defendants suggest, 
open the floodgates for future plaintiffs wishing to attack 
legislators for their votes on controversial budgeting matters.  We 
hold only that the doctrine of absolute immunity, as it pertains to 
local legislators, does not shield executive officials from 
liability for a course of conduct taken prior to and independent of 
legislative action, even if those officials were simultaneously 
members of the local legislative body that ratified the conduct.  
In a situation similar to the one we considered in Aitchison,  
disgruntled constituents cannot pursue government officials simply 
because budgetary constraints or organizational efficiencies have 
dictated the elimination of a job.  A specific employee can, 
however, challenge a county executive who misuses public office to 
get rid of that employee's job because the employee's political 
activities have displeased the county executive.   
        IV.  The County's Claim to Legislative Immunity  
     The district court also held that the Allegheny County 
and Tom Foerster in his official capacity were not entitled to 
legislative immunity from suit under Section 1983.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm this holding as well. 
     Our resolution of this issue necessarily begins with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978).  In 
Monell, the Court overruled a portion of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961), to find municipalities liable as 
"persons" under Section 1983.  "[I]t is when execution of a 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 
responsible under Section 1983."  Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 
at 2037-38 (emphasis supplied).   The phrase "made by its lawmak- 
 
ers," practically forecloses the argument  that the Court meant to 
leave open the possibility that local governments were entitled to 
legislative immunity under Section 1983.   In addition, the Court 
rejected the municipality's argument that it was entitled to 
absolute immunity "lest our decision that such bodies are subject 
to suit under §1983 ‘be drained of meaning.'" Monell, 436 U.S. at 
701, 98 S.Ct. at 2041, quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
248, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974).    The Court in Monell stopped short 
of imposing respondeat superior liability on local governments.  
Its subsequent decisions have, however, steadfastly adhered to the 
general principle that local governments will be held responsible 
under § 1983 for their violations of constitutional and federal 
rights.   As long ago as 1979, the Court in Lake Country Estates, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171 
(1979) extended legislative immunity to regional legislators.  More 
important for our purposes, the Court also implied in Lake County 
Estates that the regional governing body had no such immunity, 
stating: "If the respondents have enacted unconstitutional 
legislation, there is no reason why relief against TRPA itself [the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency] should not adequately vindicate 
petitioners' interests."  Id. at 405, 99 S.Ct. at 1179 n. 29 
(citations omitted).  This statement alone calls defendants' 
argument into serious doubt. 
     Shortly thereafter, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980),  the Court held that municipali- 
 
ties lacked qualified immunity under Section 1983.  Justice 
Brennan's reasoning in the majority opinion in Owen bears on our 
resolution of this case.  First, Brennan noted the language of § 
1983, which makes no mention of immunities or any exceptions to the 
scope of liability.  "Its language is absolute and unqualified; no 
mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may 
be asserted." Owen, 445 U.S. at 635, 100 S.Ct. at 1398.  Neverthe- 
 
less, the Court conceded, some common law immunities were so fully 
entrenched at the time the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1871, 
that they were implicitly incorporated into the Act.    
     The Court then considered whether any type of  immunity 
protected local governments in 1871 and found two.  The first, the 
distinction between governmental and proprietary acts, was ruled 
out as a basis of immunity under § 1983 because it was a form of 
sovereign immunity, abrogated by Congress, "the supreme sovereign 
on matters of federal law," when it included local governments as 
"persons" within the Civil Rights Act's scope of liability.  Id., 
at 647-48, 100 S.Ct. at 1413.  The second doctrine of immunity, 
which protected municipalities for "discretionary" activities of a 
public or legislative nature, was equally inapplicable because "a 
municipality has no ‘discretion' to violate the Federal Constitu- 
 
tion; its dictates are absolute and imperative." Id. at 649, 100 
S.Ct. at 1414.  Thus, neither doctrine of immunity supported the 
City's claim of qualified immunity under § 1983.  
     The Supreme Court further increased municipal exposure to 
liability in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 
1292 (1986), when it held that a single decision of a municipal 
ity's "properly constituted legislative body" could subject it to 
liability under § 1983. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298.  Pembaurleaves 
little, if any room, for the argument that the Court meant 
to "preserve" municipal legislative immunity. 
     Recently, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court reinforced 
its expansive interpretation of § 1983 liability when it rejected 
a district court's heightened pleading standard for suits brought 
against local governments.  Referring to Owen and Monell, the Court 
declared, "These decisions make it quite clear that, unlike various 
government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from 
suit - either absolute or qualified - under § 1983."  Leatherman, 
113 S.Ct. at 1162.  
     The Supreme Court's past treatment of local governments 
under Section 1983 compels our decision today that Allegheny County 
is not entitled to legislative immunity in this case. Were we to 
hold in defendants' favor, we fear this doctrine of "legislative 
immunity" would cut away the core principle of Monell and Owen:  
Local governments, unlike individual legislators, should be held 
liable for the losses they cause.  Moreover, a doctrine of 
legislative immunity for local governments  might have the 
undesirable effect of encouraging a county council to adopt all of 
its policies through a series of legislative actions passed by a 
newly created "Board" or "Council".  
     Other policy concerns also support our analysis.  First, 
we do not believe local governments face the same mix of perverse 
incentives as individual legislators when sued or threatened with 
a lawsuit.  When a legislator considers a piece of legislation, we 
expect him to consider the best interests of the people he serves, 
not the size of his own wallet.  As the Supreme Court has recog- 
 
nized, "In many contexts, government officials are expected to make 
decisions that are impartial or imaginative, and that above all are 
informed by considerations other than the personal interests of the 
decisionmaker."  Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223, 108 S.Ct. at 542.  If 
the legislator is held personally liable for suit, however, even 
the most conscientious public officer will be encouraged to vote 
against legislation that may be beneficial for the community at 
large for fear that personal liability will outweigh his genuine 
interest in helping his constituents.  The public officer will 
think less about the needs of the city or the county, in order to 
protect his own monetary and personal interests.  Or, he may even 
decide to forgo public office altogether.  See Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975).  In sum, the result of personal 
liability is the chilling of potentially beneficial legislative 
activity and the distraction of public officials from community 
matters.  "In this way, exposing government officials to the same 
legal hazards faced by other citizens may detract from the rule of 
law instead of contributing to it." Id. 
     The same concerns do not arise when local governments are 
held liable for violations under  § 1983.  First, city or county 
liability for constitutional violations only adds to the collective 
risk of loss that the legislator already should be considering when 
he decides whether or not to enact a new piece of legislation.  If 
a county policy causes a constitutional wrong, the county should be 
made to bear the losses caused by that violation.  As Justice 
Brennan explained in Owen, the central purpose of the Civil Rights 
Act was to provide citizens with a remedy against those who had 
abused state power.  "It hardly seems unjust to require a municipal 
defendant which has violated a citizen's constitutional rights to 
compensate him for the injury suffered thereby.  Indeed Congress 
enacted §1983 precisely to provide a remedy for such abuses of 
official power."  Owen, 445 U.S. at 654, 100 S.Ct. at 1417.  
     In addition,  liability on the part of the local 
governing body may deter future unconstitutional legislation, 
thereby contributing to the enforcement of constitutional norms 
within our society. "The knowledge that a municipality will be 
liable for all of its injurious conduct ... should create an 
incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness 
of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting 
citizens' constitutional rights." Id. at 651-52, 100 S.Ct. at 1416.  
Efforts to enact legislation that causes harm to the community 
(including the compensation paid for violation of constitutional 
rights) should be chilled.   
     Finally,  because a legislator's own money is not at 
risk, county liability does not distract the legislator from his 
job of serving the community's interests.  True, the legislator 
must contend with lawsuits brought against the county, but that 
distraction is borne equally by the local populace as a whole (at 
least in tax dollars) and not by any particular individual.  If  a 
county council forgoes enactment of legislation because it fears 
potential liability for the county under § 1983, its decision 
reflects a rational calculation that, whatever a given policy's 
benefits, its risk of liability outweighs its collective benefit to 
the community.  This is exactly the type of reckoning we want to 
encourage our legislators to make. 
     Defendants argue, however, that legislative immunity for 
the county is necessary to protect legislators from judicial 
inquiry into their motives in enacting legislation.  This argument 
lacks weight given the intent-based inquiry of certain doctrines of 
Constitutional law.  "Developments in federal law over the last 30 
years have tied the constitutionality of many types of municipal 
legislation directly to the purpose and motive of the legislation."  
Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(citing cases).  For better or worse, lawsuits concerning constitu- 
 
tional matters such as equal protection, the First Amendment, and 
substantive due process all require judicial inquiry of the 
legislator's motive.  See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977) (proof of 
discriminatory motive necessary to show violation of Equal 
Protection Clause);  Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 134 (1988) (deliberate 
and arbitrary government decision, including one "tainted by 
improper motive," violated developer's substantive due process 
rights) and Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, __ F.3d __, __ (3d Cir. 
1996)(evidence of officer's intent admissible when intent is 
integral element of underlying constitutional violation).  These 
cases illustrate that judicial inquiry of legislative motive is not 
per se forbidden.  We therefore will not undercut core doctrines of 
Constitutional law by applying legislative immunity to municipali 
ties under § 1983.     
     Finally, we note the uniform manner in which our sister 
circuits have dealt with this issue.   See Berkley v. Common 
Council of City of Charleston, 63 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 1995), cert, 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 775 (1996); Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 70; Reed v. 
Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943; Kuzinich v. County of Santa 
Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of 
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1251 (1982).  We know of no circuit that 
currently accepts the doctrine of municipal legislative immunity 
under Section 1983.  
                        IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district court's 
judgment against the defendants insofar as it holds that neither 
Tom Foerster, in his individual or official capacity, nor Alle- 
 
gheny County are entitled to legislative immunity in this case. 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
                                I. 
         In 1976, over a strong dissent by Justice Powell, the 
Supreme Court announced its decision in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347 (1976), holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the dismissal of certain government employees on the 
basis of political affiliation.  In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 
507 (1980), over a similar Powell dissent, the Court clarified 
Elrod by making clear that: (1) Elrod prohibits dismissal on the 
basis of party affiliation even if the discharged employee cannot 
show that he or she was coerced into changing his or her politi 
cal allegiance; and (2) government employees can be dismissed for 
their party affiliation only when the government can show that 
certain political beliefs are necessary to carry out the duties 
of those offices.  Then, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illi 
nois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the Court extended the Elrod principle 
to include hiring as well as firing.  But Justice Scalia, un 
daunted by a decade and a half of Elrod's hegemony, wrote a 
powerful dissent, building upon the words of Justice Powell, and 
assailing the Elrod-Branti-Rutan trilogy as not only amounting to 
bad constitutional law, but also as reflecting a deep misunder 
standing of the essential role that the patronage system has 
played in American history and political tradition. 
         As this recitation suggests, the view that the Elrod- 
Branti-Rutan trilogy was a serious mistake will not die.  That it 
will not is, I suspect, because of the compelling logic of the 
Powell and Scalia arguments, described infra, as well as the fact 
that the total domination of election campaigns by money and 
special interests that we have seen in recent years not only adds 
fuel to the fire of the Powell and Scalia arguments, but renders 
them prophetic.  The need to reexamine the trilogy, which is what 
I will argue for, is thus counseled by new developments in the 
years since the trilogy was complete.  The need is doubled in 
spades by the extreme result in the present case.   
     The "extreme result" is that the majority has been led 
by the Elrod trilogy to rule, in effect, that any political 
leader who advises his political associates to discharge a 
political opponent may be subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for a First Amendment violation.  Although the present defendant, 
"Boss" Foerster, is a public official and a member of the Salary 
Board, under the majority's logic, Foerster would be liable as a 
§ 1983 co-conspirator if he were a private citizen-political boss 
who gave the same "orders" he is charged with giving here, to me 
a quite startling proposition.  This result causes me to question 
whether there is now any limit to examination in the courts or 
under the aegis of the courts (through depositions and interroga 
tories) of any government personnel or procurement decision that 
gores the ox of someone who can claim political foul.  And, query 
whether there is any limit to the judicial examination of the 
mental processes and conversations of defendants in such cases.  
If there is not, the fundamental premise of representative 
government -- that it is our public officials who are held 
accountable for their actions at the ballot box rather than their 
political "bosses" -- seems not only challenged, but also under 
mined. 
         The 1996 election campaigns were startling in the 
extent to which the influence of money and special interest 
groups so clearly dwarfed the role of the political parties in 
affecting the outcomes.  But this is the very specter that loomed 
so large in the sights of Justice Powell when he decried the 
results in Branti:  
         Particularly in a time of growing reliance 
         upon expensive television advertisements, a 
         candidate who is neither independently 
         wealthy nor capable of attracting substantial 
         contributions must rely upon party workers to 
         bring his message to the voters.  In contests 
         for less visible offices, a candidate may 
         have no efficient method of appealing to the 
         voters unless he enlists the efforts of per 
         sons who seek reward through the patronage 
         system.  Insofar as the Court's decision 
         today limits the ability of candidates to 
         present their views to the electorate, our 
         democratic process surely is weakened. 
Branti, 445 U.S. 528-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).  As the forego 
ing comments suggest (and as I will elaborate), I see the trilogy 
as extremely deleterious to the national polity.  That is because 
it has seriously undermined certain traditions that have helped 
our democracy to flourish.   
         I recognize that I am a judge of an inferior court, but 
that does not preclude me from expressing an opinion where I feel 
strongly that the Supreme Court has gone down a dangerous path it 
ought to reconsider.  U.S. v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.) ("While, therefore, the demurrer must 
be overruled, I hope it is not improper for me to say that the 
rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian 
morals, does not seem to me to answer to the understanding and 
morality of the present time."). 
         Thus, although I am constrained by the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence to concur in the present opinion and judgment, and 
therefore do so, I write separately to express my dismay about 
the way in which the First Amendment patronage jurisprudence has 
evolved.  This opinion is energized by the scenario of the case 
at bar and the recent developments to which I have adverted.  
                               II. 
         I begin with a description of the problem clearly 
identified by the Powell and Scalia dissents.  In essence, the 
patronage system historically has been critical to the survival 
and strength of political parties by allowing party leaders to 
reward their party faithful.  Strong parties have, in turn, 
played a crucial democratizing role: they have stimulated 
political activity and encouraged meaningful political debate; 
they have enabled local candidates for office to attract 
attention to their candidacies and galvanize grass-roots 
organizing; and they have facilitated the political participation 
of historically excluded groups, see Rutan, 497 U.S. at 108 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By supporting and ultimately 
dominating a particular party ‘machine,' racial and ethnic 
minorities have -- on the basis of their politics rather than 
their race or ethnicity -- acquired the patronage awards the 
machine had to confer."). 
     Moreover, as Justice Scalia noted in Rutan, the 
"patronage system does not . . . merely foster political parties 
in general; it fosters the two-party system in particular."  Id.at 106.  
If patronage jobs are available to workers who have 
chosen a winning candidate, campaign workers are more likely to 
choose a party with a chance of prevailing, rather than one with 
non-mainstream views.  This tends to foster the preservation of 
the two-party system, as parties must ensure that their message 
has wide appeal to attract rank-and-file members.  
     As I see it, the Elrod trilogy has deprived parties of 
one of the most effective tools for building party unity:  
prospect of future political jobs for a job well done.  The blow 
that this has dealt patronage systems has contributed to the need 
of political candidates to rely almost exclusively on media and 
money-intensive campaigns to succeed.  That politics has come to 
be dominated by money, and hence large contributors and political 
action committees (PACs) have achieved a significant sway, has 
been true for a number of years now, but it surely cannot be 
doubted in the wake of the 1996 election campaigns.  This effect 
has been felt most significantly at the local level, where 
candidates, particularly challengers who have no PAC money to 
draw on, can generate little support.  Without personal wealth, 
such candidates are doomed to failure.  See Branti, 445 U.S. at 
528-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).  I, of course, do not mean to 
suggest that the trilogy is the only reason for the massive 
influence of money in election campaigns, nor could I credibly do 
so given the ascendency of the mass media over so many aspects of 
national life, and the high cost of media advertising.  But, it 
is at least a significant contributing factor.   
     Additionally, although the rise of modern, media- 
intensive campaigns has surely benefitted the democratic process 
by allowing some candidates to make broad-based appeals to the 
entire public, access to the media is limited to those candidates 
who can afford it, a terrible state of affairs.  Moreover, the 
nature of modern campaigns has not rendered obsolete the crucial 
work done by individual party workers, particularly in local 
races.  "Certainly they have not made personal contacts 
unnecessary in campaigns for the lower level offices that are the 
foundations of party strength, nor have they replaced the myriad 
functions performed by party regulars not directly related to 
campaigning.  And to the extent such techniques have replaced 
older methods of campaigning (partly in response to the 
limitations the Court has placed on patronage), the political 
system is not clearly better off."  Rutan, 497 U.S. at 105 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).    
     The decline of the patronage system has had other 
significant consequences for the character of the electoral 
process.  The weakening of the party system affects the ability 
of voters to make educated choices among candidates, as voters 
with little information about candidates historically have looked 
to their party for cues.  "With the decline in party stability, 
voters are less able to blame or credit a party for the 
performance of its elected officials.  Our national party system 
is predicated upon the assumption that political parties sponsor, 
and are responsible for, the performance of the persons they 
nominate for office."  Branti, 445 U.S. at 531 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).  Weaker parties also adversely affect citizen 
participation in the democratic process.  Contrast the appalling 
national turnout of 48% in the 1996 presidential election, 
notwithstanding the vaunted impact of motor-voter registration 
laws, with the much higher turnout in years past when the 
political parties were stronger.  That in itself is an ominous 
sign. 
     The deleterious impact of special interest money does 
not lessen after election day, as has often been noted.  
According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he replacement of a system 
firmly based in party discipline with one in which each 
officeholder comes to his own accommodation with competing 
interest groups produces 'a dispersion of political influence 
that may inhibit a political party from enacting its programs 
into law.'"  Rutan, 497 U.S. at 107-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 531 (Powell, J., dissenting)).  
Additionally, as the decline in party strength hastens the rise 
of special interest groups, which are necessarily focused on 
narrow issues, government suffers because "candidates and office- 
holders are forced to be more responsive to the narrow concerns 
of unrepresentative special interest groups than to overarching 
issues of domestic and foreign policy."  Branti, 445 U.S. at 532 
(Powell, J., dissenting).  Such ills, fostered by the dominance 
of money in elections, can only grow more significant, as each 
election brings more expensive campaigns. 
     In a similar vein, Justice Powell explained that 
"[s]trong political parties aid effective governance after 
election campaigns end.  Elected officials depend upon appointees 
who hold similar views to carry out their policies and administer 
their programs.  Patronage . . . serves the public interest by 
facilitating the implementation of policies endorsed by the 
electorate."  Id. at 529.  
     It is also clear to me that the premise of Branti -- 
that the accountability of elected officials to the voters is 
satisfied by exempting policy making officials from Elrodscrutiny -- is 
not sound.  Anyone with experience in government 
knows that officials of lower rank can undermine the policies of 
an administration just as effectively as higher ranking persons. 
Indeed, commentators have recognized that the Supreme Court has 
drawn a distinction between "partisan" patronage employees and 
"politically-neutral" civil servants.   
     According to one article, "[t]here is no empirical 
basis for this distinction.  Highly protected career bureaucrats, 
who have strong ideological attachments to political causes or 
policies may also be motivated by partisan objectives, and these 
objectives can be inconsistent with the goals of elected 
officials.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court ignores the 
agency problems faced by politicians in securing the compliance 
of government workers in molding and administering policy."  
Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected 
Bureaucracy, and Reinventing Government, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 791, 
820-21 (1995) (footnotes omitted).  
     At the same time, the regime of the trilogy has created 
widespread uncertainty among government officials as to the 
legality of hiring and firing certain government employees.  The 
line between who can be discharged for political affiliation and 
who cannot under Branti is less than pellucid, to say the 
least.  This has required time-consuming and ongoing training 
of management-level government employees lest they run afoul of 
its precepts.  In my view, Justice Powell was right when he said 
that "[a] constitutional standard that is both uncertain in its 
application and impervious to legislative change will now control 
selection and removal of key government personnel.  Federal 
judges will now be the final arbiters as to who federal, state, 
and local governments may employ. . . . [T]he Court is not 
justified in removing decisions so essential to responsible and 
efficient governance from the discretion of legislative and 
executive officials."  Branti, 445 U.S. at 525-26 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
         I acknowledge, of course, that I have not made an 
empirical study of the impact of the Elrod trilogy, but a survey 
of the literature reveals no satisfactory data.  On a matter 
such as this, I believe that seasoned judgment of those with 
experience in the political process is the best guide.  Moreover, 
I share Justice Scalia's view that to "oppose our Elrod-
Brantijurisprudence, one need not believe that the patronage system is 
necessarily desirable; nor even that it is always and everywhere 
arguably desirable; but merely that it is a political arrangement 
that may sometimes be a reasonable choice, and should therefore 
be left to the judgment of the people's elected representatives."  
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 110 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
                               III. 
     I do not claim that the patronage system is without 
flaw.  The abuses of the system have been well documented over 
the years.  But while patronage systems have their faults, the 
damage that the Elrod trilogy has done to the polity weighs, on 
balance, in favor of permitting elected officials to hire and 
fire based on political affiliation.  Moreover, what is too often 
forgotten is that most patronage appointees--whether maintenance 
employees of municipalities, county clerks, or federal judges-- 
perform honorably and well.  And when they do, they bring credit 
upon the party that had them appointed and justify support 
therefor.  While a distinction is often made between patronage 
and merit appointment, patronage employees are, far more often 
than not, true merit employees.  The problems of the patronage 
system can be dealt with, and historically have been dealt with, 
through civil service reform and other measures, rather than 
through constitutional litigation.   
     Turning to that aspect of the matter, as Justice Powell 
noted in his Elrod dissent, the "judgment today unnecessarily 
constitutionalizes another element of American life -- an element 
certainly not without its faults but one which generations have 
accepted on balance as having merit."  Elrod, 427 U.S. at 389 
(Powell, J., dissenting).  I am also concerned by the 
proliferation of Elrod-generated litigation (an on-line review 
reflects that Elrod has now been cited 1249 times by federal 
courts alone), which is now extending rapidly to procurement 
decisions, such as the award of towing contracts, in addition to 
personnel decisions.  See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of 
Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2553 (1996).  The growing number of Elrod-based 
cases has imposed a burden on federal trial and appellate 
courts, embroiling them in the time-consuming and often quite 
difficult exercise of divining where a duty is sufficiently 
policy oriented to except an employee from Elrod scrutiny.   
     In sum, given the sea change in politics, even since 
Rutan, characterized primarily by the decline of political 
parties and the dominance of elections by money, I submit that it 
is time for the Supreme Court to revisit this area of the law.   
     It seems that the import of the majority's discussion 
on causation is that, if the fact-finder determines that the 
Salary Board would have itself decided to eliminate plaintiffs' 
positions, Foerster must be absolved.  Perhaps I am incorrect.  
At all events, the plaintiffs' claim should really be cut off at 
the pass, i.e. now.  I lament that it cannot be, but hope that 
the Supreme Court will accept Justices Powell and Scalia's 
wisdom.  As Justice Frankfurter once stated, "Wisdom too often 
never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it 
comes late."  Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
